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OPERATION OF BUSINESSES BY TRUSTEES
Common law trust principles impose a duty of conservative pru-
dence upon trustees administering the estates of decedents. This
comment analyzes these traditional rules in terms of whether they
provide realistic and workable standards when applied to trustees
who are charged with the continuation of a decedent's business.
RECENT YEAR.S have evidenced an increasing interest in the use of
the trust device' to continue going businesses.2  This development is
attributable to several factors. There are more commercial enter-
prises in the United States today than at any other time in history.3
Experience indicates that the bargaining position of a retiring owner
or of an executor attempting to sell a business is weak.4 Thus, apart
""[W]e are seeing a day in which the properties left behind by the heads of Ameri-
can families are less likely, to be balanced portfolios of capital assets and are more
likely to be going businesses. The problem of modern trusteeship . .. is therefore
likely to be not so much one of safe conservation of assets .. . as it is one of alert
and successful management of going businesses." Shattuck, The Art of Estate Planning,
87 TRusTS & ESTATES 13 (1948).
Since Mr. Shattuck's statement, the contents of professional journals bear out his
prediction. See, e.g., Barclay, Continuing Business in Estates, 102 TRusrs & EsrATEs
138 (1963); Cowdery, When a Trustee Has a Business to Handle, Trust Bull., June
1958, p. 14; Durand, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 95 TRUSrS & ESTATES
907 (1956); Foulke, The Family Business: How Special Division of Trust Department
Handles Closely Held Firms, 100 TRusrs & ESTATES 606 (1961); Golden, Perpetuating
Family Business Through Estate Planning, 99 TRusrs & ESTATES 906 (1960); Handling
Businesses in Trust, 93 TRUSTS & EsTATES 105 (1954); Palmer, Handling Problems of
the Close Corporation, 101 TRusTs & EsrATEs 1046 (1962); Pope, When Trustee Goes in
Business, 91 TRusTs & ESTATES 8 (1952); Stratford, Handling Businesses in Trust, Trust
Bull., Dec. 1957, p. 38; Wilking, Trustee's Compensation for Handling Businesses in
Trust, 99 TRusT & ESTATES 12 (1960); Willcox, Blueprint for Handling Business Interests,
98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 662 (1959).
Most of the trust business and litigation concerning trustee-held businesses has arisen
in the context of testamentary trusts. Thus, unless it is stated to be otherwise, "settlor"
may in this comment be read as synonymous with "testator."
2 Only a settlor's sole proprietorship or interest in a corporation will be considered
in this comment. Treatment of partnership interests is omitted because the opportunity
for the trustee's active participation in the affairs of the business is completely gov-
erned by the acquiescence of the surviving partner or partners. See CRANE, PARTNERSIP
§ 90a (2d ed. 1952); Fuller, Partnership Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise
After the Death of a Partner, 50 YALE L.J. 202, 209-10 (1940).
8 See U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT 490 (1965).
' The basic problems lie in valuing the business. The owner of a sole proprietor-
ship may have difficulty in selling his business for what he feels is its real value, since
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
from tax considerations, resort to the trust device allows a settlor
much of this value may be in the form of good will. Likewise, the owner of shares in
a close corporation may encounter difficulties in finding a market for his shares in addi-
tion to valuation problems.
Since an executor or administrator traditionally does not have authority to continue
a decedent's business, see cases cited notes 17-19 infra, he normally will be forced to
liquidate the business at a substantial loss. Even to the extent that modem statutes
permit a continuation of a decedent's business in the course of winding up his estate,
see note 10 infra, the time limit usually involved magnifies the market and valuation
problems encountered by the owner.
5Although tax considerations are beyond the scope of this comment, they neverthe-
less warrant some attention because of the crucial role which they may play in the
selection of the trust device to continue a business. Among the principal nontax
reasons for employment of the trust device are: (1) temporarily, to preserve the value
of the assets for the sale of inventory in the normal course of business or the going
concern value of the business with a-view toward preventing sacrificial disposition; (2)
permanently, to ensure a continuing income for the designated beneficiaries at a rate
which normally will exceed that obtainable from other investments.
Since such motives are in no way inconsistent with the retention of direct control by
the owner of the business for as long as he is able, a testamentary trust will normally
be employed. However, an owner who wished to preserve the business for minor chil-
dren or one willing to forego total control in order to remove business earnings from
his gross income and to-incur the gift tax rather than the higher estate tax could employ
an inter vivos trust. Mehlman, Planning for Continuation of a Business Interest, 1966
INS. L.J. 92. See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GiFT TAxES §§ 39.1-.6
(2d ed. 1962). By appointing himself a trustee in the latter instance, the owner-settlor
could retain some control over the management of the business. Hawkins, Planning the
Form of the Gift, Family Tax Planning for the Owners of a Small Business, 13 W. REs.
L. REv. 300, 309-11 (1962). But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677 (b). In a corporate
context the permissible controls would seemingly encompass voting the stock and serving
as a director or officer. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671, 675 (4); compare Helvering
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942).
Where a testamentary trust is employed, the tax advantages available in passing on
a proprietorship or corporate interest are comparable to those of non-business interests.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2031, 2033. By use of one or more life estates and remain-
der (s) over, only one estate tax will be imposed prior to disposition by the remainderman.
See LOWNDFS & KRAMER, op. cit. supra §§ 4.9, 41.1; Gray & Low, How to Save Taxes
Through Family Trusts, 1 P-H TAX IDEAs REP. 13,009.2 (1965).
Where a close corporation is involved, however, the planner must weigh some
dearly disadvantageous results of employing the trust device. First, use of the trust
form would preclude qualification for or terminate a prior election under Subchapter
S. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (a). Poor timing as to the effective date of the coin-
mencement of the trust could accumulate up to twenty-three months of income from
a Subchapter S corporation into one taxable year of the estate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1372; Strasburger, How to Plan the Disposition of Business Interests at Death, 2
P-H TAx IDEAs REP. 126,002.3 (1964). Secondly, while a loss suffered in relation to
business stock qualifying under § 1244 may be treated as an ordinary loss when held by
an individual, INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1244 (a)- (c), such a loss is denied this favored
treatment when the stock is held by a trust. Strasburger, supra. Finally, if the corpora-
tion involved does not declare dividends or otherwise "is not likely to be income
producing during the life of the surviving spouse," the settlor will have difficulty claim-
ing the benefit of a marital deduction under either the gift or estate tax provisions.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-5 (f) (1958). In order to overcome this difficulty without having
to grant the spouse a power to compel conversion of the trust corpus into more produc-
tive assets, the settlor can transfer the business into a non-qualifying trust and transfer
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to avoid a disadvantageous sale of his business and to provide a
greater income from his beneficiaries6 while insulating them from
liability.7 Further, the present body of competent professional trus-
tees in the United States should make the prospect of leaving a
business in trust even more attractive. Institutionalized methods
of research, data processing, efficiency, and widespread contact with
the relevant economic community place the professional trustee in
an ideal position to handle business interests successfully 8
Irrespective of the ability of an individual trustee, the ultimate
success of a business left in trust will depend upon whetherthe basic
concepts of trust law are adaptable to the exigencies of business. The
purpose of this comment is to consider whether the status of a trustee
is compatible with the role of an entrepreneur. Necessarily accom-
panying this undertaking is the establishment of some guidelines for
trustee action in the business world.
A. Undertaking the Business
At the outset, the prospect for successful administration of
the business may be assessed with reference to four basic factors:
(1) proper authorization to carry on the business; (2) the standards
to which the trustee must conform his administration; (3) the assets
available to carry on the business; (4) the extent to which the
trustee must personally perform the requisite acts of administration.
(1) Authority. A trustee may derive his authority from the
income-producing assets into the marital deduction trust. Scharfy, Problems Relating
to: Redemption of Stock in the Family Business; Income in Respect of a Decedent;
Marital Deduction Considerations, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 346, 355 (1962).
For a comprehensive discussion of planning factors involved in the disposition of
business interests, see Professor Polasky's series of articles: Planning for the Disposition
of a Substantial Interest in a Closely Held Business (pts. 1-3), 44 IowA L. Rav. 83 (1958),
45 IOWA L. REv. 46 (1959), 46 IowA L. Rxv. 516 (1961).
' An interesting case in point is Holmes v. Hrobon, 93 Ohio App. 1, 103 N.E.2d 845
(1951), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 158 Ohio St. 508, 110 N.E2d 574 (1953), in which
decedent's laundry business, valued at almost 90,000 dollars for inheritance tax pur-
poses, returned 32,000 dollars of net income per year to the income beneficiary of the
trust. It would have taken 640,000 dollars invested in normal trustee investments to
achieve a like result. Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Strangle-
hold on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, I: The- Unincorporated Business,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 515-16 (1962).
'See generally 3 Scor, TRUSTS §§ 274-79 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as ScoTr].
I See Becker, A Lawyer's Challenge on Trustee Management of Family Businesses,
100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 506 (1961); Smith, How to Operate a Business, 98 TRusrs :
EsTAT.S 1141 (1959).
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trust instrument,9 statute,' 0 or consent of all interested parties."
In the absence of proper authorization, he is absolutely liable for all
losses sustained in carrying on the business and must account for all
profits.' 2
While it is generally recognized that a business may properly be
the subject matter of a trust,'3 courts have been consistently reluc-
tant, whatever the alleged source of authority, to permit a trustee to
operate a business.1 4  This attitude is based upon the belief that
normal fluctuations of business fortune are so unpredictable that a
trustee should not risk trust funds in such an investment, 5 that the
9 See, e.g., Moore v. McFall, 263 Ill. 596, 105 N.E. 723 (1914); Mann v. Peoples-
Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 256 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1953); Willis v. Sharp, 113 N.Y. 586,
21 N.E. 705 (1889); In the Matter of Estate of Ebbett, 144 Misc. 260, 267 N.Y. Supp. 268
(Surr. Ct. 1938); AMUNSON, Wais § 121 (2d ed. 1953).
10 Some of this legislation provides that executors and administrators may continue
a decedent's business for a limited time for the purpose of expediently settling the
estate. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 213a (Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.83 (1964);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-9-7 (1956); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 238 (1956). Other statutes
allow possible in'definite continuation upon application to the proper court for permis-
sion. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1402 (1963); Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 2113.30 (Page
1953).
This comment is primarily concerned with continuation by a trustee for the latter
purpose while the statutes generally apply to executors and administrators in the con-
text of their duty to settle and distribute the estate of a deceased. Yet since indefinite
continuation is possible in any event and because an executor or administrator is in any
case governed by trust law, Jacob, Trusts for Continuing a Decedent's Business, 18 IowA
L. REv. 43, 52 & n.24 (1932), trust principles elicited in this comment are relevant for
a representative acting under any statutory authority to continue a decedent's business.
11 The generic phrase "interested parties" includes the decedent's creditors and dis-
tributees. The consent required may take the form of explicit agreement. See, e.g.,
Daniel v. Bank of West Point, 147 Ga. 695, 698, 95 S.E. 255, 256 (1918): "If a testator
can give legal direction as to the management of his estate after his death, there seems
to be no reason why the legal and equitable owners of an estate . . . cannot do the
same thing by directing the operation of the business after all the debts of the estate are
paid, to the extent of their own interest."
Furthermore, interested parties may be foreclosed from asserting an executor or
administrator's lack of authority and consequent liability for losses by the knowing
acceptance of benefits accruing from a representative's unauthorized continuation of a
decedent's business. See, e.g., In re Hemshorm's Estate, 184 Ore. 365, 198 P.2d 597
(1948) (creditors); Parry's Estate, 244 Pa. 93, 90 Ad. 443 (1914) (beneficiary).
12 See, e.g., Cates v. Cates, 268 Ala. 6, 104 So. 2d 756 (1958); Cochran v. City of
Nome, 10 Alaska 425 (Dist. Ct. 1944); Peterman v. United States Rubber Co., 221 Ill.
581, 77 N.E. 1108 (1906); Root's Estate v. Blackwood, 120 Ind. App. 545, 94 N.E.2d
489 (1950); In the Matter of Estate of Ferrante, 190 Misc. 788, 74 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Surr.
Ct. 1947); In re Jennings Estate, 74 Mont. 449, 241 Pac. 648 (1925).
13 See generally BOGERT, TRUsTs & TRusT=Es § 112 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
BOGERT]; 1 ScoTr § 74.1.
"I See cases cited notes 15-17 infra.
'1 See, e.g., Eufaula Natl Bank v. Manasses, 124 Ala. 379, 382, 27 So. 258, 259 (1900);
Sebree v. Rosen, 349 S.W.2d 865, 888 (Mo. 1962). See notes 95-106 infra and accompany-
ing text for discussion of traditional treatment of investments in business.
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knowledge and skill required to operate a business are beyond the
expected capacity of the average trustee,16 and that continuing a
decedent's business is fundamentally at odds with the proposition that
one's creditors are entitled to immediate satisfaction of their claims
at his death.17  Reflecting their apprehension, courts require that
authority from the settlor be granted in "direct, explicit and un-
equivocal language"'8 and strictly construe any ostensibly relevant
language.'9 Similarly, most statutory provisions sanction continua-
tion of a decedent's business only for such time as is necessary for
the expedient winding-up of his estate.20 Furthermore, obtaining
the consent of all interested parties may present certain practical
difficulties.2 1
20 Sebree v. Rosen, supra note 15, at 889.
27 Willis v. Sharp, 113 N.Y. 586, 591, 21 N.E. 705, 706 (1889) (dictum).
28 Id. at 590, 21 N.E. at 70; accord, Pearce v. Pearce, 199 Ala. 491, 74 So. 952 (1917);
In the Matter of Estate of Gibson, 46 Misc. 2d 954, 261 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Surr. Ct. 1965); In
the Matter of Estate of Blaszkiewicz, 33 Misc. 2d 884, 227 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Surn. Ct. 1962);
In the Matter of Will of Bancroft, 196 Misc. 787, 93 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Surf. Ct. 1949);
Gould v. Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213 N.Y. Supp. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Hull v. Heimrich,
138 Ore. 117, 3 P.2d 758 (1931); Kirkman v. Booth, 11 Beav. 273, 50 Eng. Rep. 821
(1848).
"' That the courts should strictly construe the trust provisions is normally incident
to the requirement that authority to continue a business be explicitly granted. Thus,
where the trustee is given broad powers to deal with trust property, it makes little
difference whether denying the trustee power to continue a business is based on the
settlor's failure specifically to state "continue my business" or on the strict construction
of the powers given. Compare Hull v. Heimrich, supra note 18, and Gould v. Gould,
supra note 18, with Eufaula Nat'l Bank v. Manasses, 124 Ala. 379, 27 So. 258 (1900).
In Hull and Gould, the trustees of estates which included substantial interests in corpo-
rations were given very broad powers of investment and reinvestment of trust funds.
When the trustees lent trust funds to their respective corporations to facilitate con-
tinued operation, the loans were held unauthorized since the trustees had not been
granted authority, in so many words, to continuethe business. In the Eufaula Bank
case, the court recognized that the continuation of the testator's mercantile business
involved sale of trust assets and reinvestment of the proceeds, which the trustee was
empowered to do, but nevertheless strictly construed those provisions to avoid that
result.
However, more illustrative of the extent of judicial reluctance to allow a trustee
to continue a business are cases where authority seemingly is granted in specific terms
but is construed away. In the Matter of Kohler, 231 N.Y. 353, 132 N.E., 114 (1921),
held that explicit authority "to continue any business now owned and carried on by
me [testator]" did not constitute authority to manage corporations which were allied
with the testator's sole proprietorship and in which the testator owned a majority
share, since the corporations did not constitute a business owned and carried on by the
testator. But cf. In re Peroff's Will, 209 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sun. Ct. 1960).
Saperstein v. Ullman, 49 App. Div. 446, 63 N.Y. Supp. 626 (1900), aff'd, 168 N.Y. 636,
61 N.E. 553 (1901), which held that testatrix' provision that "It is my wish that my
husband [executor] continue the clothing business as now conducted" was merely
precatory and therefore did not authorize him to continue the business.
20 See note 10 supra.
21 For example, creditors and distributees may be difficult to ascertain or, having
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(2) Standard of Care. Once the trustee is established as the
operator of a business, his acts are governed by the judicially de-
veloped "prudent man" rule. According to this standard, the trustee
must exercise such care and skill in dealing with the trust as would
an ordinary prudent man dealing with his own property.22 The
trustee's acts are assessed according to an objective standard23 applied
been ascertained, may withhold consent, doubting the ability of the representative.
While these facts do not foreclose the representative from continuing a business, he
will be responsible for any diminution in the value of the assets at the time of the
decedent's death. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 200 A.2d 441 (Sup.
CL 1964); Clark v. Tennessee Chem. Co., 167 Ga. 248, 145 S.E. 73 (1928); Harris Trust
& Say. Bank v. Wanner, 393 Ill. 598, 66 N.E.2d 867 (1946); Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust
Co., 3 N.J. 545, 71 A.2d 184 (1950); In the Matter of Will of Mendleson, 46 Misc. 2d
960, 261 N.YS.2d 525 (Surr. Ct. 1965); In re Patchogue Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 89
N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1949); In re Parks' Trust, 39 Wash. 2d 763, 238 P.2d 1205
(1951); RFrATEMENT (SECoND), TRusTs § 174, comment a (1959). But see In the
Matter of Estate of Cook, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 At. 730 (Ch. 1934); In re Whiteley, 33
Ch. D. 347 (1886) (opinion of Lindley, L. .J.), aff'd sub nom. Learoyd v. Whiteley, 12
App. Cas. 727 (1887). In Whiteley, the court stated: "A trustee ought to conduct the
business of the trust in the same manner that an ordinary prudent man of business
would conduct his own .... [I]n applying [the rule] ... care must be taken not to
lose sight of the fact that the business of the trustee, and the business which the
ordinary prudent man is supposed to be conducting for himself, is the business of in-
vesting money for the benefit of persons who are to enjoy it at some future time, and
not for the sole benefit of the person entitled to the present income. The duty of a
trustee is not to take such care only as a prudent man would take if he had only
himself to consider; the duty rather is to take such care as an ordinary prudent man
would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people
for whom he felt morally bound to provide." 33 Ch. D. at 355. In Cook, the court
repeated the Restatement rule of care, cited Whiteley, and observed: "In other words
he must take no risks which would not be taken by an ordinarily prudent man who is
trustee of another person's property." 20 Del. Ch. at 126, 171 Ad. at 731. (Emphasis
added.)
The rule of Whiteley and Cook is different from the textual statement to the
extent that the element of cautious conservation, in addition to reasonable care and
skill, is injected into the standard of care. See 3 Scorr § 227.3; note 101 infra. The
distinction is between a general statement of a trustee's standard of care and the par-
ticular crystallization of that standard with reference to trustee investments. It would
seem inappropriate to state the general rule of care in the same terms as are applied
to investment situations since there is no necessity to require the added element of
cautious conservation in a trustee's non-investment transaction. (For an argument indi-
cating it makes little sense to include the conservation element even in an investment
situation, see note 112 infra).
Therefore, it appears that a trustee charged with continuing a business must, in
general, conduct himself as would a reasonably prudent businessman engaged in a
similar operation. See Palmer v. Moore, 82'Ga. 177, 8 S.E. 180 (1888); In the Matter
of Friedlander, 189 App. Div. 90, 178 N.Y. Supp. 50 (1919). Yet when the trustee en-
gages in a transaction involving an outlay of funds for the improvement or expansion
of the business, there is evidence that the courts will apply the Whiteley rule to his
conduct. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text for a further consideration of
this problem.
28 See, e.g., Knox v. MacKinnon, 13 App. Cas. 753, 766 (1888); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRusrs § 174, comment a (1959); 3 Scorr § 227, at 1661.
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to the circumstances existing and reasonably foreseeable when the
trustee acted.2 4 The trustee is liable for any injury or loss to the trust
occurring through his failure to act with the requisite circum-
spection.2 5
(3) Assets. Whether the trustee has sufficient funds to operate
his business is of fundamental importance. Primary sources of such
assets are funds earmarked by the settlor for use in the business and
the general funds of the settlor's estate. Access to these sources is
limited by the settlor's intent.26 It is generally held that a simple
authorization to continue a business indicates no more than that the
trustee may utilize only those assets committed to the business at
the settlor's death.7 Access to these sources is further limited by the
24 See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 200 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct.
1964); In the Matter of Will of Mendleson, 46 Misc. 2d 960, 261 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Surr. Ct.
1965); In re Patchogue Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1949); In
re Parks' Trust, 89 Wash. 2d 763, 238 P.2d 1205 (1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRSrs
§ 174, comment b (1959); 3 ScoTr § 227, at 1662.
2r See generally 2 id. § 201. To a limited extent, a settlor may relax the standard
to which his trustee would normally be held by inserting exculpatory provisions in the
trust instrument. However, courts generally place a strict construction upon such
provisions. See RIESTATEmENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 222, comment a (1959); 2 Scorr § 222.2;
Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments, 42 YALE L.J. 359 (1933); Comment,
Directory Trusts and the Exculpatory Clause, 65 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 138, 141 (1965); Note,
Trusts: Effect of Exculpatory Clause, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 165 (1940). The reason for this
attitude is that the obligation to conform to a minimal standard of conduct is inherent
in the very nature of a trust relationship and may not be bargained away by the parties
to a trust. Thus, an exculpatory provision may not go so far as to excuse liability for
self-dealing, bad faith, gross negligence, and reckless indifference to the interests of the
beneficiaries. See authorities cited supra. Compare UNIFORM TRUSTS AaT §§ 3-5, 17.
26 E.g., Burwell v. Cawood, 43 US. (2 How.) 559 (1884); Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn.
307 (1829); Moore v. McFall, 263 Ill. 596, 105 N.E. 723 (1914); Willis v. Sharp, 113
N.Y. 586, 21 N.E. 705 (1889); In the Matter of Estate of Gibson, 46 Misc. 2d 954, 261
N.Y.S.2d 550 (Surr. Ct. 1965); Furst v. Armstrong, 202 Pa. 348, 51 Ad. 996 (1902); Ex
parte Garland, 10 Vesey Jr. 110, 32 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ch. 1804).
27 Burwell v. Cawood, supra note 26; Pitkin v. Pitkin, supra note 26, Moore v. Mc-
Fall, supra note 26; Willis v. Sharp, supra note 26; In the Matter of Estate of Gibson,
supra note 26; Ex parte Garland, supra note 26. Contra, Furst v. Armstrong, supra note
26.
One basic factor to which the courts look in ascertaining the settlor's intent is the
existence of other particular devises, bequests, and legacies. The manifest inconvenience
which would result if legacies and so forth had to be called back to satisfy the debts in-
curred in the continuation of the settlor's business prompted the Supreme Court, in
Burwell v. Cawood, supra note 26, to assert: "[N]othing but the most clear and un-
ambiguous language, demonstrating in the most positive manner that the testator in-
tends to make his general assets liable for all debts contracted in the continued trade
after his death, and not merely to limit it to the funds embarked in that trade, would
justify the court in arriving at such conclusion." 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 577.
Another factor considered by the courts in determining intent is the hazard involved
in carrying on a business. See Willis v. Sharp, supra note 26, at 591, 21 N.E. at 706.
However, where there are no legacies and authority to continue a business is conferred,
the trustee will generally have resort to the general assets of the estate if he is given
broad powers of management. See Moore v. McFall, supra note 26.
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possible diminution or depletion of the settlor's estate by creditors
exercising their right to immediate satisfaction of their claims upon
his death.28
A scarcity of estate capital may necessitate resort to additional
methods of raising sufficient funds to continue the business. The
most common method is mortgaging trust property. The trustee
must be able to support his incumbrance-creating transaction by
authorization from the express or implied terms of the trust instru-
ment or from a statute.29
(4) Delegation. For various reasons, the trustee may not wish
to take active part in the conduct of the business.80 However, it is
familiar trust doctrine that a trustee may not delegate certain acts
and duties to another without becoming absolutely liable for any
losses caused by the delegatee's act.81 Because the settlor seemingly
placed great faith in the trustee's talent and capabilities by charging
him with the care of his property,82 it is generally held that the
trustee must personally perform those acts and duties which require
the exercise of discretion, while those merely "ministerial" in nature
may be delegated to an agent.3 3  Professors Scott 34 and Bogert 5
28 See, e.g., Willis v. Sharp, supra note 26.
29 See gefierally 2 ScoTr § 188.5.
30 For example, the trustee may be inexperienced in the particular type of business
involved in the trust; he may wish to groom a member of the settlor's family for
eventual ownership of the business; he may be engaged in other activities which inter-
fere with his opportunities for constant supervision of the business.
Professional trustees have complained that normal compensation, see note 83 infra,
is inadequate for the time, talent, and responsibility of continuing a business in trust.
See, e.g., Cowdery, Basis of Compensation for Handling Businesses in Trust, Trust
Bull., June 1957, p. 2; Wilkins, Trustee's Compensation for Handling Businesses in
Trust, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 12 (1960); 10 AusrT. L.J. 144 (1936).
O' See, e.g., Law v. Bush, 239 Ala. 612, 195 So. 885 (1940); Bates v. Jones, 224 Ala.
82, 139 So. 242 (1932); In re Wood's Estate, 159 Cal. 466, 114 Pac. 992 (1911).
Delegation carries another important sanction. For example, a trustee will not be
permitted to subject the trust to the expense of hiring an agent to accomplish that
which the trustee is reasonably expected to perform personally. See, e.g., In the Matter
of Estate of Sellers, 31 Del. Ch. 158, 181-82, 67 A.2d 860, 871 (Ch. 1949). The ques-
tion arises whether the "expenses" rule differs from the "absolute liability" rule. It
has been asserted that the two are to be distinguished. Note, Delegation of Fiduciary
Duties, 46 IowA L. Rxv. 127, 128-29 (1960). Yet it appears that in either case, the
same test-the rule of prudence-is being administered. See notes 34-36 infra and
accompanying text.32 See, e.g., Gaines v. Dahlin, 228 Ala. 484, 488-89, 154 So. 101, 104 (1934); Trustees
of Rutgers College v. Richman, 41 N.J. Super. 259, 288, 125 A.2d 10, 26 (Ch. 1956);
Woddrop v. Weed, 154 Pa. 307, 315, 26 At. 375, 377 (1893).
8 E.g., Garrett v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Ala. 467, 172 So. 611 (1937); North Ameri-
can Trust Co. v. Chappel, 70 Ark. 507, 69 S.W. 546 (1902); Spengler v. Kuhn, 212 I11.
186, 72 N.E. 214 (1904); Ball v. Consolidated Realty Co., 246 Ky. 458, 55 S.W.2d 60
(1932); Herr v. United States Cas. Co., 347 Pa. 148, 31 A.2d 533 (1943); West v.
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point out that nearly any act involves the exercise of some discretion
and that the distinction between valid and invalid delegation is
properly understood as an application of the'"prudent man" rule.3 6
Thus, if a reasonably prudent man engaged in a task similar to the
trustee's would entrust the accomplishment of certain acts to an
agent,37 the trustee may do so also.38
On any reasonable analysis, it would appear that the trustee
could not be expected to handle every minute detail of operating a
settlor's business.3 It is equally clear that the trustee may not
completely divorce himself from supervision of the business.40 Be-
tween these extremes the determination of "reasonableness" de-
pends upon the individual circumstances of each case. Without
attempting to assess all the possible situations, it is helpful to outline
some basic areas of difficulty and to assess judicial approaches to
them. For purposes of discussion, it is expedient to distinguish
between trustee management of an individually owned enterprise
and an incorporated business.
When the trustee is charged with continuing an individually
owned enterprise, the basic issues are whether he must personally
undertake the day-to-day transactions of the business or whether
he may employ a manager, and in the latter event, what degree of
Hapgood, 141 Tex. 576, 174 S.W.2d 963 (1943); Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252
Pac. 91 (1927).
S, 2 SCOTT § 171.2, at 1280.
"1 BOGERT § 555, at 57.
8 See, e.g., Walters-Southland Institute v. Walker, 222 Ark. 857, 263 $.W.2d 83
(1954); McLean v. Peyser, 169 Md. 1, 179 At. 58, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 638 (1935);
Indian Head Nat'l Bank v. Thierault, 97 N.H. 212, 84 A.2d 828 (1951); Dodge v.
Stickney, 62 N.H. 330 (1882); Speight v. Gaunt, 22 Ch. D. 727, aff'd, 9 App Cas. 1
(1883).
'I See cases cited note 36 supra.
"l Of course, the trustee must use reasonable care in the selection of an agent. See,
e.g., Walters-Southland Institute v. Walker, 222 Ark. 857, 263 S.W.2d 83 (1954); In the
Matter of Estate of Whipple, 19 N.Y.S.2d 105, 110 (Surr. Ct. 1940); 2 ScoTr § 225.1.
"1 See cases cited note 38 supra.
According to the Restatement, factors involved in ascertaining the propriety of
delegation are the following: (1) the amount of discretion involved; (2) the character
and value of the property involved; (3) whether principal or income is involved; (4)
the proximity of the subject matter of the trust; (5) whether the trustee has the
requisite skills to perform the act. RSTATEAMENT (SECOND), TRusrs § 111, comment d
(1959). For a catalogue of decisions involving specific fact situations, see Note,
46 IowA L. REv. 127 (1960).
"0 See Gaines v. Dahlin, 228 Ala. 484, 154 So. 101 (1934); Attorney General v. Olson,
346 Mass. 190, 191 N.E.2d 132 (1963); Milbank v. J. C. Littlefield, Inc., 310 Mass. 55,
36 N.E.2d 833 (1941); In the Matter of Mild, 25 N.J. 467, 136 A.2d 875 (1957); Woddrop
v. Weed, 154 Pa. 307, 26 At. 375 (1893); Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91
(1927).
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control over the busipess he must maintain. One case, El Boletin
Popular Pub. Co. v. Springer,41 squarely raises the delegation issue
in the context of a trustee-operated business. In Springer, two
printing and publishing companies transferred their physical assets
and good will to three trustees with directions to do all that was
"necessary and proper" to carry on the publication of a Republican
newspaper. The trustees transferred the business premises to a third
party under a lease which stipulated that the lessees would carry on
the business according to the provisions of the trust instrument and
that the lessors might repossess the property in default of any of
the provisions. In a suit by the settlors to discharge the trustees for
having delegated matters requiring the exercise of discretion,42 the
court held the trustees' conduct proper inasmuch as they retained
means of supervisory control.43  However, the difficult issue, never
reached since the settlors admitted that the trust did not impose
daily managerial duties upon the trustees, 44 was whether hiring a
manager to conduct the business would have been an improper dele-
gation. Nevertheless, the case is instructive as to the extent of
supervisory control a tristee must exercise over a hired manager.4"
"- 33 N.M. 275, 265 Pac. 713 (1928). The Springer case did not involve the operation
of a typical sole proprietorship since the business had been conducted in corporate
form. However, the trust consisted of physical assets, not stock, transferred to the
trustees by the corporations owning the assets, thus distinguishing the situation from
that which exists when a sole or majority shareholder transfers stock to a trustee with
instructions to continue the business. See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
42 The settlors' concept of the duties of the trustees included the following: "That
a competent manager shohld be employed to look after . . . details, who would be
directly under the control of the trustees, and subject absolutely to their orders, and
whose employment would be subject to the will of the trustees, and that the trustees
would closely scrutinize all obligations incurred, as well as all plans for the advancement
of the business interests of their trust, and would authorize or reject all proposed busi.
ness policies. In other words [the trustees] . . . were to act as a sort of board of
directors, whose duty it was to meet regularly and dictate the policies and business
principles of the trust, maintaining always a close personal contact and supervision of
the business." 33 N.M. at 282, 265 Pac. at 715-16.
,8 Id. at 282, 265 Pac. at 716.
41 Id. at 282, 265 Pac. at 715. See note 42 supra.
"5 Having found that the trustees had not divested themselves of control of the trust
by the terms of the lease, see note 43 supra, the court set forth their duties "They
must see that [the lessee] ... does not involve the trust estate in liability for expense or
damage. They must examine his quarterly reports, verify them, and see that possible
profits are divided 2s agreed. They must keep in touch with the news and editorial
policies...." 33 N.M. at 282, 265 Pac. at 716.
Analogizing the lease to a contract for employment of a manager, it would seem
that it must not in terms be irrevocable for any any designated period but rather should
proyide for termination for failure to comport with the basic purposes of the trust.
As to other views on the extent of supervision, see note 59 infra.
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Notwithstanding the settlors' admissions, the court intimated that
the extent of delegation of managerial duties was to be decided with
reference to reasonableness under the circumstances.46  In this case,
relevant considerations included the broad provisions of the trust
instrument47 and the fact that the trustees, living some distance from
each other and from the situs of the business, could not conveniently
meet to review the operation of the business. 48
Other circumstances upon which a trustee might rely in pre-
dicting the limits of proper delegation include the settlor's former
managerial practice, 49 the methods currently employed by others
engaged in operating a similar business on a comparable scale, 50 and
the trustee's possession of the requisite.skill for the act in question.0 1
In contrast to the trustee of an individually owned enterprise,
the trustee charged with carrying on a corporation does not have
plenary managerial control of the enterprise52 since the trust res is
stock and not the business assets themselves. Therefore, the oppor-
tunity for active participation in management is largely dependent
on the voting power of his stock.53
0 33 N.M. at 281, 265 Pac. at 716. The extent of the court's sympathetic attitude
in adopting the reasonableness test may be seen by comparing the result which would
have obtained if the court had undertaken to base its decision on a classification of the
various activities which execution of the trust entailed. It is difficult to ascertain any
elements of publishing a newspaper which are not matters requiring the exercise of
"discretion" and, consequently, not subject to delegation. This would seem to be
especially the case with respect to the content of editorials and the like.
47 The only specific duties imposed upon the trustees were to render annual reports
and to divide profits, if any, equally between the trustors and to conduct the publica-
tions as Republican newspapers. Id. at 281, 265 Pac. at 715.
's Ibid.
"9 See Turnbull v. Pomeroy, 140 Mass. 117, 3 N.E. 15 (1885); Herr v. United States
Gas. Co., 347 Pa. 148, 31 A.2d 533 (1943).
GOThe statement in the text follows from the "prudent man" rule, assuming,
of course, that evidence of the customary practices of businessmen is generally ac-
cepted to ascertain the standard of requisite prudence. Thus, evidence of the man-
ner in which prudent men are dealing with their own property is admissible in
justification of a trustee's conduct. E.g., In re Flynn's Estate, 205 Okla. 311, 237 P.2d
903 (1951).
1 See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Sellers, 31 Del. Chi. 158, 67 A.2d 860 (Ch.
1949); In the Matter of Estate of Greata, 172 Misc. 955, 17 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Surr. Ct.
1939). But see In the Matter of Estate of Gutman, 171 Misc. 680, 14 N.Y.S.2d 473
(Surr. Ct. 1937).
2 In the Matter of Will of Shupack, 1 N.Y.2d 482, 154 N.Y.S.2d 441, 136 N.E.2d 513
(1956).
"O See In the Matter of Estate of Nicklesburg, 34 Misc. 2d 82, 224 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Surr.
Ct. 1961). It is assumed for the purpose of this comment that the settlor or the
settlor and the trustee individually own at least a controlling interest in the corpora-
tion, since otherwise an instruction that trustees carry on his "business" would be
meaningless.
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Assuming, however, that the trustee has sufficient voting power
to elect himself to a directorship, the question arises whether failure
to do so is an improper delegation of business decisions to persons not
parties to the trust.54 The issue is clouded for two reasons. In the
first instance, it may be difficult to ascertain exactly what "carrying
on" an incorporated business means. 55 Furthermore, since the
trustee technically is given stock and not physical business assets,"
there may be logical difficulty in asserting that the trustee, as share-
holder, has the power, susceptible of delegation, to make business
decisions.
To a large extent, the result of any given case will probably be
dependent upon the activities of the settlor prior to his placing the
business in trust. Thus, if the trust involves a family corporation of
which the settlor was the sole stockholder and the major director,
active managerial duties might reasonably be expected of the trus-
tee.57 By analogy to the Springer case,55 it would appear that, at
the very least, the trustee must keep himself informed of the activities
a& The possibility of such a result is suggested by several courts and commentators.
See In the Matter of Estate of Kirkman, 143 Misc. 342, 256 N.Y. Supp. 495 (Surr. Ct.
1932) (alternate holding); Elias v. Schweyer, 13 App. Div. 336, 340, 43 N.Y. Supp. 55,
58 (1897) (dictum); Cahn, Estate Corporations, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 186, 187 (1937);
Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold on the Trustee-
Controlled Business Enterprise, 11: The Incorporated Business, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 816,
828 (1962); Trachtman, Closely Held Businesses, 90 TRusTs & ESTATES 668, 674 (1951);
Comment, Trusts-The Fiduciary Aspects of Estate Corporations, 57 MICH. L. REv. 738,
740 (1959).
a Compare In the Matter of Kohler, 281 N.Y. 353, 182 N.E. 114 (1921), with In the
Matter of Estate of Kellner, 66 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
The problem is caused by the difficulty in identifying the settlor with a "business."
In the Kohler case, the testator had been a director and officer of several corporations
of which he owned a majority share. He directed that his trustees continue any
business in which he was engaged. The court stated that "the individual influence and
ultimate control by a majority stockholder does not in itself constitute in any proper
sense a business owned and carried on by such stockholder." 281 N.Y. at 867, 132 N.E.
at 117. As an alternative to "carrying on" the settlor's estate, the trustee may simply
treat his holding as a normal investment from which he receives dividends payable to
the beneficiaries. Under this alternative his duty is simply to retain the investment
so long as it remains prudent to do so. If on analysis of the business he finds the
investment to be risky, it would be his duty to sell the interest. See cases cited note 105
infra. If, on the other hand, the trustee is to conduct the business, his duty, by in-
ference, would be to do that which is necessary to ameliorate any conditions affecting
the financial stability of the business.
56 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold on the
Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, II: The Incorporated Business, 110 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 816, 827-28 (1962); Trachtman, suprd note 54, at 674.
38 See notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
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of the directors59 and in a position to effect changes6 0 and must
exercise reasonable prudence in the choice of those who do actually
operate the business.61
B. Sustaining the Business
Obsolescence and ordinary use of physical business assets may
necessitate the expenditure of trust funds or the creation of con-
tingency reserves to keep the trust property suitable for the efficient
carrying on of the business. If the trustee is to avoid bearing general
trust expenses personally, 62 he must have proper authority to incur
them. 63  When maintenance or replacement expenses occur in the
trust context, doctrines of "repairs"' and "improvements" 4 may
hamper the administration of the trustee who continues a business.
It is generally held that a trustee need not be explicitly authorized
by the trust instrument to incur expenses for repairing trust prop-
erty.65  This result follows from the trustee's duties to preserve66
"' Consider the position of the Trust Division of the American Banker's Association
on the subject of actual management of a business on a day-to-day basis:
"It should be distinctly understood that a controlling interest in a closely held busi-
ness on either a permanent or temporary basis does not mean that the bank is expected
actually to run the business. The role of the bank in most instances is to make sure
that adequate management is retained and that the operation of the business is properly
supervised for the benefit of the deceased owner's estate.
"In almost every instance it should be the goal of the bank to obtain a key man who
is capable of actually managing the business .... " TRUSr Div., AmERICAN BANKEas
ASS'N, HANDLING BUSINESSES IN TRUST 11 (1959). See also, Cowdery, When a Trustee Has
a Business to Handle, Trust Bull., June 1958, p. 14; Foulke, How Special Division of
Trust Department Handles Closely Held Firms, 100 TRusrs & ESTATrES 606, 608 (1961)
(obtain manager to operate; once a year review of his administration considered
sufficient to discharge duty).
0" The trustee's major sanction in his supervisory capacity is his voting power.
Thus, he must not compromise the exercise thereof by entering into: (1) voting agree-
ments. In re Palmer's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sur. Ct. 1954). (2) proxy agreements
where he is the owner of a controlling share of the stock. See 2 Scorr § 193.3, at 1465.
01 In re Koretzky's Estate, 8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951).
02 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
68 See 2 Scorr § 188.
04 For a discussion of improvements, see notes 85-94 infra and accompanying text.
0 E.g., In re Boyd, 231 Iowa 1325, 4 N.W.2d 387 (1942); Maynard v. Columbus, 150
Ky. 817, 819, 150 S.W. 1019, 1020 (1912).
0" See Whittingham v. Schoefield's Trustee, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2444, 61 S.W. 846,
modified, 68 S.W. 116 (Ct. App. 1902); Martin v. Eslick, 229 Miss. 234, 90 So. 2d 635
(1956), corrected, 229 Miss. 261, 92 So. 2d 244 (1957); Annett-Mahnken Realty Co. v.
Gollin, 110 N.J. Eq. 469, 16Q Ad. 400 (1932); In the Matter of Will of Lavery, 79
N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sur. Ct. 1948) (dictum), afl'd mem., 275 App. Div. 674, 87 N.Y.S.2d
221 (1949); In the Matter of Estate of Farrell, 152 Misc. 118, 272 N.Y. Supp. 852 (Sur.
Ct. 1933); Parry's Estate, 244 Pa. 93, 90 At. 443 (1914).
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trust property and to make it productive.67 Generally stated, the
trustee is allowed to make those repairs reasonably necessary to
preserve trust property,68 a result derived from application of the
"prudent man" standard.69 While the foregoing is orthodox theory
and would undoubtedly lead to liberal recognition of the power to
make whatever alterations serve the best interests of the trust,70 it is
believed that judicial attitudes and the actual decision-making
processes are often conditioned by other historical factors. Thus, it
may be suggested that when the courts determine the propriety of
repairs the underlying consideration is actually whether the bene-
ficiary reasonably ought to be charged with the particular expense.
Support for this view is indicated by the fact that the decisive issue
in most cases regarding trustee expenditures for altering trust prop-
erty is not really a question of the power to incur the expense;
rather, the authority to charge an expenditure to the corpus or the
income of the trust is the crucial point.7 '
Apparently, the rules as to the allocation of alteration expenses
developed in the context of the rules governing the right of legal
life tenants and remaindermen.72  A legal life tenant has the duty
to prevent deterioration of the estate at his own expense.73 Similarly,
it is the settled trust iule that expenses for repairs are payable out of
income.74 However, since a legal life tenant is obliged only to pre-
vent waste,75 it is easy to understand that an income beneficiary's
self-interest would prevent the trustee from charging him with more
67 See Spooner v. Dunlap, 87 N.H. 384, 180 At. 256 (1935).
68 See Whittingham v. Schoefield's Trustee, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2444, 2447, 67 S.W. 846,
848, modified, 68 S.W. 116 (Ct. App. 1902).
For a catalogue of those alterations which have been classified by courts as
"repairs," see BOGERT § 600, at 356.
6' Whittingham v. Schoefield's Trustee, supra note 68, at 2447, 67 S.W. at 848.
70 See In re Boyd, 231 Iowa 1325, 1332, 4 N.W.2d 387, 392 (1942) (dictum).
71 Russell v. Rusell, 109 Conn. 187, 193-94, 145 AtI. 648, 651 (1929).
71 See, e.g., Estate of Cole, 102 Wis. 1, 9, 78 N.W. 402, 405 (1899); 2 PERRY, TRusTs
& TRusrEm § 477b (7th ed. 1929); Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administra-
tion: A Stranglehold on the Trystee-Controlled Business Enterprise, I: The Unincorpo-
rated Business, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1962).
7' E.g., Superior Oil Corp. v. Alcorn, 242 Ky. 814, 47 S.W.2d 973 (1931); Prescott v.
Grimes, 143 Ky. 191, 136 S.W. 206 (1911); In re Hubbell's Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d
888 (1951).
7' See 3 Scott § 233.3, at 1757.
75 The trustee's duty to preserve is clearly analogous. See note 68 supra and accom-
panying text.
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than his legal counterpart could be compelled to pay in an action
for waste.76  It should not be understood, however, that the rights
of legal life tenants and income beneficiaries correspond precisely.
Often, an income beneficiary will be forced to bear the cost of altera-
tions which normally would be allocated to the corpus of the trust,
since circumstances may exist in which it is both equitable and
necessary to utilize income instead of corpus if the trust is to achieve
its purposes. 7 Nevertheless, it does appear that the analogy to waste
is at least one factor behind the rule that repairs may be made to
preserve trust property.
To permit a trustee to take only those measures calculated to
preserve trust property or cause it to .produce a reasonable income
does not usually hinder trustee administration of rental realty. Since
land is a basic and limited commodity, a minimum of piecemeal
repairs should re-attract any tenants who may have been initially
repelled by the condition of the premises. However, because of
stiffer competition and fluctuating consumer desires, the trustee in
the business of selling goods or services may never recover from an
economic lapse induced by the forced retention of old assets until
the last bit of profit can be squeezed from them.78
In theory, however, it should not be difficult to surmount the
traditionally required showing of immediate necessity, since the
trustee must administer his trust with the prudence of a reasonable
man.79 Proper emphasis on the necessities of business would make
the long-term interests of the beneficiaries the relevant index to the
propriety of the trustee's expenditures. Thus, the trustee could show
that while the business may at any given time be in reasonable
physical repair and returning a reasonable income, unless it keeps
70 Compare 2 PERRY, TRuSTs & TRUSTEs § 477, at 814 (7th ed. 1929).
77 Utilization of trust income may be necessary where substantial expenditures for
alterations normally classifiable as "improvements" cannot be supported by the prin-
cipal and yet are needed in order to make the trust productive. See In the Matter of
Will of Ambrose, 12 App. Div. 2d 687, 207 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1960) (memorandum decision).
78 An illustration of the consequences of a failure to modernize is the present situa-
tion of American Motors, Inc. A decade ago, this corporation seemed in fine financial
condition: profits were good and the management used them to pay off all obligations
and to supplement shareholder dividends. The company now finds itself in economic
straits. Experts attribute its current condition to the fact that management of a decade
ago neglected to utilize the profits on a planned program of updating their operation to
maintain the company's competitive position. See Time, Jan. 28, 1966, p. 79.
7' See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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pace it may eventually lose its competitive position. Such a result
would preclude the possibility of any income or at least necessitate
drastic and expensive rehabilitative measures. 0 This argument is
further supported by the observation that common business practice
involves the maintenance of reserves for depreciation. 81
8 0 See In re Boyd, 231 Iowa 1325, 4 N.W.2d 387 (1942). In Boyd, the trustee held
property which included a fifty-year-old farm house; he proposed to make substantial
alterations of the house-removal of a porch, re-siding the house with asbestos, reduction
of the size of windows, re-flooring, replastering-at a cost of $1,457.60 to be paid from
the income of the trust. Objecting, the income beneficiary alleged that the proposed
repairs were unnecessary to put the house in rental condition and that any repairs
absolutely necessary could be made at a cost of $300. The court held that the trustee
was justified in making the proposed alterations and charging the cost to the income
beneficiary, finding that the question was "whether the repairs should be made piece-
meal, which undoubtedly the trustee has a right to do, or whether they should be made
now .... The longer the making of such necessary repairs is postponed, the greater
will be the expense when made." Id. at 1331, 4 N.W.2d at 391.
81 There is some question though as to whether trustees may properly reserve income
in anticipation of repairs. See 3 Sco-r § 239A; Copron, Reserves Against the Deprecia-
tion of Real Property Held by a Trustee, 12 OHio ST. L.J. 565 (1951). With regard to
buildings held in trust the failure of some courts to sanction any plan for reserves is
posited on the premise that buildings do not depreciate in any real sense. See 3 Scotrt,
§ 239.4, at 1870; Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold
on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, I: The Unincorporated Business, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 506, 532 (1962). Nevertheless, if the trust consists of a going business,
there should be no impediment to the reasonable reservation of income to meet de-
preciation expenses. See Rafferty v. Parker, 241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957); In re Trust
of Bailey, 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954); Re Rose [1940] 1 D.L.R. 139 (N.B.);
Re Robertson [1951] 3 D.L.R. 241 (Ont.).
For an excellent discussion of the basis of American decisions against trustee re-
serves, see Krasnowiecki, supra at 522-32.
As to a settlor's corporation, it is commonly held that retention of earnings for re-
serves, rather than payment by way of dividends to the beneficiaries, is improper.
In the Matter of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Sur. Ct. 1937);
In the Matter of Estate of McLaughlin, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct.
1937). Contra, Green v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 329 Pa. 169, 175, 196 Atl. 32, 34
(1938) (dictum). The problem is whether the courts should treat the corporation
merely as a device utilized to administer the settlor's investments, in which case normal
rules of trust administration would apply, or whether the corporation should be con-
sidered as an entity unto itself. If the latter approach is adopted, the propriety of
a trustee's participation in a decision not to declare dividends would be decided with
reference to corporate law and the trustee-director's duty to the corporation as a whole.
See Cahn, supra note 54, at 136; Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 738, 746-47 (1959). The
present state of the law indicates that the trustee commits a breach of trust in failing
to prevent the accumulation of reserves depending upon whether he owns all the
stock or only a controlling portion thereof. Compare Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N.J.
Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953), with In the
Matter of Estate of Adler, supra. Professor Krasnowiecki argues, however, that the
trustee's major duty is to cause the business to produce income. Therefore, if this
goal, in the long run entails the reservation of funds from income, then accumulation
should be judicially acceptable. Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration:
A Stranglehold on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, 1I: The Incorporated
Business, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 816, 824 (1962).
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C. Expanding the Business
To undertake and sustain the settlor's business is certainly con-
sonant with the trustee's minimal duties. However, it may be con-
cluded that merely sustaining the business is not sufficient to satisfy
the purposes of the trust. In a business economy, the prospect of
rapid obsolescence of machinery and methods, variations in con-
sumer desires, and pressures of competition may compel the trustee
to ensure his business a solid position in the economic community
by taking advantage of opportunities to initiate industrial changes
and expansion. Also, the fact that a trustee may be surcharged for
too conservative an administration82 and that his compensation
usually varies directly with the income from the trust may be in-
centives to progressive action.
At this critical stage, the trustee must squarely face the question
whether trust concepts and judicial attitudes enable him to operate
successfully as the supervisor of a business. Since any program of
stabilization and expansion of a business may involve expenditures
in such areas as research, advertising, and initiation of new tech-
niques with the resultant need to acquire new and better assets, the
trustee will have to contend with the rule as to improvements if his
plans include substantial alteration of his existing physical plant and
the rule as to investments if, in general, his plans call for the outlay
of any substantial amount of money.84 Thus, these rules will con-
trol the extent to which the trustee is able to exercise his entre-
preneurial talents.
82 See Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, 27 NJ. 332, 142 A.2d 865 (1958).
Is Some statutes, e.g., N.Y. SutR. Cr. AcT §§ 285-2, 285-b, provide for compensation
of trustees according to certain percentages of the principal and income of the trust
received and paid over by the trustees. Otherwise, the normal rule is that the trustee
is entitled to compensation reasonably related to the value of his services. E.g., Steven-
son v. Moeller, 112 Conn. 491, 152 Ati. 889 (1931); Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374,
119 Ati. 341 (1923); Berry v. McCourt, 1 Ohio App. 2d 172, 204 N.E.2d 233 (1965).
When the trustee is operating a business and his compensation is fixed according
to a percentage of the principal and income involved, he is entitled only to that per-
centage even though the carrying on of a business may involve more time-consuming
and exacting activities for the trustee than are usually associated with trust admin-
istration. In re Larrabee, 98 N.J. Eq. 655, 130 At. 195 (1925); Matter of Rosenberg,
251 N.Y. 115, 167 N.E. 190 (1929); cf. In re Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y. Supp. 466
(Surr. Ct. 1927). See authorities cited note 31 supra for criticism of this rule. More-
over, when a business is involved, the trustee is entitled to a percentage of the net,
rather than gross, income of the trust. E.g., In re Larrabee, supra; Matter of Sidenberg,
204 App. Div. 255, 197 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1923).
", There are indications that "improvement" and "investment" problems are not
mutually exclusive. See notes 90-94 infra and accompanying text.
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In this connection, it is generally held that power to improve
trust property must be explicitly granted in the trust instrument.,'
As noted above,86 this rule is believed to be based upon the rights of
legal life tenants and remaindermen.87  However, since the position
of the trustee vis-4-vis the remainderman is not strictly analogous to
that of the legal life tenant, in that a trustee with general managerial
control of the administration of an active trust acts neither for him-
self nor for the sole benefit of the income., beneficiary,"" implied
power to improve is sometimes found when the alterations are neces-
sary to preserve the trust property or to make it productive. 9 While
judicial analysis in reliance upon such factors does not adequately
distinguish "repairs" from "improvements," 90 nevertheless, the cases
in which issues of preservation and productivity do exist and power
" E.g., Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 At. 648 (1929); Booth v. Bradford,
114 Iowa 562, 87 N.W. 685 (1901); Maynard v. Columbus, 150 Ky. 817, 150 S.W. 1019
(1912). See BoCaaT § 601, at 370-71, for a. catalogue of those items which have been
held to constitute improvements.
80 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
'7 See Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. The Parish of Trinity Church, 25 Conn.
Supp. 28, 195 A.2d 566 (1963) (erecting commercial building on unproductive land
held sanctioned by charitable trust, with reference to fact that no remainderman's in-
terests thereby impaired); Smith v. Keteltas, 62 App. Div. 174, 170 N.Y. Stipp. 1065
(1901) ("the interest of the remainderman is not be depleted or charged with improve-
ments unless authority to that end can be derived from some competent source').
At common law, a legal life tenant could not prejudice the capital value of the
remainderman's interest by charging thereto the cost of altering the property. Nairn
v. Marjoribanks, 3 Russ. 582, 38 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ch. 1827) (by implication). The reason
is that any such act is the voluntary act of the life tenant, for which the remainderman
should not be held responsible. Cf. Caldecott v. Brown, 2 Hare 144, 67 Eng. Rep. 60
(Ch. 1842). Thus, a trustee should have no greater power. See Estate of Cole, 102 Wis.
1, 9, 78 N.W. 402, 405 (1899).
8" See 2 PERRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 477b, at 817 (7th ed. 1929); 3 Scor §§ 232-41.
19In re Boyd, 231 Iowa 1325, 1332, 4 N.W.2d 387, 392 (1942) (dictum); Jordan v. Jor-
dan, 192 Mass. 387, 843, 78 N.E. 459, 460 (1906) (trustees, in exercise of sound business
judgment, might make extensive alterations so that income could be kept at a fixed
standard or increased in amount); Spooner v. Dunlap, 87 N.H. 384, 180 At. 256 (1935);
In the Matter of Will of Ambrose, 12 App. Div. 2d 687, 207 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1960) (memo-
randum decision). But see Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929).
In Russell, when trustees applied for judicial authority to rebuild a trust building
burned in a fire, the court noted the strict rule that authority to improve must be
explicitly granted in the trust instrument. Id. at 194-95, 145 Atl. at 652. The court
did indicate that it would sanction a plan of improvements in the exercise of
its equitable power to allow deviation from the terms of the trust. Id. at 199-200, 145
At. at 652. However, the court warned that "it is the necessity of the situation which
brings [the equitable power of deviation] ...into operation, not the mere fact that
thereby the estate may be administered in a way which will be more advantageous to
its beneficiaries." Id. at 199, 145 Ad. at 652. Compare Jordan v. Jordan, supra.
"0 Indeed, when the physical acts involved are the same and the reasons for making
the alterations are distinguishable, to call one class of alterations "repairs" and another
"improvements" does not seem to serve any useful purpose.
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to alter is denied indicate that the actual test the courts apply is
whether the expenditure will have an overall beneficial result for
the trust. In Parry's Estate91 where the settlor left assets including
an unproductive beach hotel and the trustee expended substantial
sums in rehabilitating and expanding the premises, the court ex-
plicitly viewed the transaction as an investment by the trustee and
found that
[no] ... careful man, dealing with his own property, knowing that
no income had resulted to the estate from the running of this hotel,
would have put a dollar of his own into its enlargement, much
less would have put into it moneys of an estate of which he was
trustee.92
Similarly, in the case of In re Miller,93 the trustee of farm land
which could not profitably be leased petitioned the court for per-
mission to change the farm house to an inn and to construct a golf
course. Noting that the land as it was could not produce a reason-
able income, the court nevertheless found that to undertake the
proposed changes in the hope of larger returns to the beneficiaries
was to assume too great a risk.9 This view of the trustee's transac-
dons as constituting an investment and the resultant application of
investment rules may raise serious obstacles to a trustee's taking ad-
vantage of business opportunities to expand and consolidate his
enterprise.
Generally speaking, two distinct rules governing the investment
of trust funds developed concurrently in the United States. In 1830,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held, in Harvard College
v. Amory, 5 that investments in corporate stock might properly be
made since
all that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall con-
duct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to
observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be in-
vested.9 6
01244 Pa. 93, 90 Ad. 443 (1914).
02 Id. at 98, 90 Ad. at 445.
98 62 N.J. Eq. 764, 49 At. 149 (1901).
91.d. at 767, 4 Ati. at 150.
95 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
9id. at 461.
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The Amory rule, known as the "Massachusetts Rule of Trust In-
vestments" or the "Prudent Man Rule,"97 was ostensibly followed
by the New York Court of Appeals in King v. Talbot"' but with a
narrow interpretation of "prudence." The Talbot court, notwith-
standing that prudent men do, in fact, invest in shares of corporate
enterprises, reasoned that in such a situation the safety and control
of the trust fund was surrendered to the managers of the business and
the hazards of trade-a circumstance which in the relation of trust
could not be countenanced. 9 The court indicated that funds loaned
upon bonds, mortgages, and other *evidences of debt were the only
proper investments which could be made by trustees. 00 Un-
doubtedly, the primary consideration in Talbot was to insure the
preservation of the funds for the remainderman.101 The upshot of
the decision was adherence to the proposition that the role of the
trustee was essentially conservatorial, 10 2 the creation of a "circular"
standard to which trustees were'to conform their investments,
103
97 See Shattuck, The Massachusetts Rule of Trust Investments, 82 TRuSTS & EsTATEs
23 (1946).
98 40 N.Y. 76, 85-86 (1869).
99 Id. at 88-89.
20 Id. at 89. Compare the early English rule, limiting proper trustee investments
to government securities and first mortages. See 3 Scorr § 227.4, at 1667.
The Amory court directly controverted the proposition that certain types of invest-
ments could be classified as safer than others. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461.
101 Several explanations have been advanced in support of the court's concern. First,
the early theory and practice of trusts involved the settlor's placing a valuable "thing"
in the hands of his tx2ustee, which was to be preserved and eventually to be handed over
to .the remainderman, who was entitled to exactly that which had been originally given
to the trustee. See Shattuck, New Theory of Trust Management, 84 TRusTs & EsrATES
185, 186 (1947). The Industrial Revolution was accompanied by a change in the form
of wealth, when intangibles such as stocks, bonds and currency became the primary
indications thereof. The "thing" or "res" theory carried through, however, with the
consequent recognition of the trustee's primary duty being to hand over the same value
to the remainderman. Shattuck, supra at 188.
It has also been suggested that the conservatorial function of trusts is explainable on
the grounds that, at the time settlors consider creating a trust, they are no longer the
aggressive accumulators of wealth, but rather are mature consolidators, intent upon
protecting that which they have accumulated. See Torrance, Legal Background, Trends
and Recent Developments in the Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROs. 128, 136-37 (1952).
12 See note 101 supra.
"' "[T]he external standard of 'such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence
would exercise in dealing with his own property' is not the standard he would use in
dealing with his own property if he had only himself to consider .... In other words
he must take no risks which would not be taken by an ordinarily prudent man who
is trustee of another person's property.
"The next observation to be made is that the primary object to be attained by a
trustee in the matter of investing the funds confided to his control is their safety."
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and a number of statutes strictly delimiting the area of proper
trustee investments and generally excluding investments in corporate
stock. 104
The view of the trustee's role as a conserver can be contrasted
with the role of the ordinary businessman, a creator of wealth, whose
financial manipulations are generally fraught with more substantial
risks than are those of a conservative investor.105 In light of the
traditional presumption that investments in business are inherently
imprudent,106 the "trustee-entrepreneur" seems almost a contradic-
tion in terms, since any expenditures to enlarge a business may be
termed an investment in the business. 0 7  This unfavorable judicial
attitude first appears in the hesitancy with which courts permit a
trustee to undertake a settlor's business. 08  The crucial question
here, of course, is not how liberal courts should be in permitting a
trustee to undertake a business, but rather what degree of freedom
they should allow him once he has begun operating it. There are
several factors which tend to the conclusion that investment factors
should not stifle a trustee-businessman's attempt to keep his business
abreast of the market.
First, because of increasing controls on the present economy,
many of the elements of a laissez-faire economy, which made business
investments especially hazardous in the first place, 00 have been
In the Matter of Estate of Cook, 20 Del. Ch. 128, 126-27, 171 Ad. 730, 731 (Ch. 1934).
(Emphasis added.) See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 559-61, 200
A.2d 441, 447-48 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
o20 Apparently to remedy the uncertainty which the "Massachusetts prudent man
rule" engendered among trustees, at one time at least three-fourths of the American
jurisdictions adopted "legal lists" of proper trustee investments. Legislation, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 821 (1936) (containing a list and discussion of relevant statutes). Between
1830 and 1937, only six states adhered to the Massachusetts rule. Torrance, supra note
101, at 188.
'
0 Comparison is often made between "speculation," a "businessman's risk" and
a proper trustee investment: "A businessman's risk lies between the area of speculation
and the area of trust investment. The chaiacteristics of the businessman's risk often
are (a) that the enterprise is not widely known to investors or (b) that the participa-
tion is selling on a yield basis which . . . is greater than the current rate or (c)
the activities of the enterprise in question are of a wasting nature or are novel or are
relatively hazardous." Shattuck, The Massachusetts Rule of Trust Investments, 82
TRusTs & EsTATFs 23, 89 n.100 (1946).
10a See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. 1, 144 S.E. 787 (1928); Brown v. Brown, 72 N.J.
Eq. 667, 65 Ad. 739 (1907); King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869); Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa.
518, 121 Ad. 810 (1923); Hamphill's Appeal, 18 Pa. 803 (1852); Legislation, 49 HAY.
L. RFv. 821 (1936) (statutes); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 891 (1940).
107 See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
108 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
108 See Torrance, Fifty Years of Trust Investments, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 250-52
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eliminated. This relative safety is reflected in the increasing re-
placement of "legal lists" of proper trustee investments with the
.'prudent man" rule.110 Although now proper investments under
this rule generally must be in businesses that have a history of
financial stability in a firmly entrenched commercial field,111 the
"prudent man" revolution at least indicates a basic change in the
once prevailing attitude toward business.
Second, the tenor of modem trust instruments, with liberal pro-
visions in favor of income beneficiaries, indicates that settlors do not
conceive the function of trusts to be rigidly conservational." 2  To
the contrary, well-drawn trust instruments now manifest a desire that
trustees exercise more aggressive administration to build up, rather
than merely conserve, income and principal. Since the professed aim
of the courts is to find and follow the intent of the settlor, perhaps
there are grounds for reassessing the justification'for holding the
trustee to the standard of the prudent conserver.
Third, and most important, is the apparent judicial recognition,
in two fairly recent cases, that utilizing trust funds to aid in the
authorized continuation of a settlor's business is not properly char-
acterized as an "investment," but rather as an outlay of funds in-
herently connected with the concept of continuing a business." 8
(1952). "Perhaps it is too often forgotten that those were the days of such flamboyant
operators as Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, and Daniel Drew; in fact [King of Talbot] ... came
in the spring of the same year as the famous "Black Friday" engineered by Gould and
Fisk. Small wonder.that a court would frown upon the use by trustees of a form of
investment which could so easily become a plaything for speculators .... Id. at 250.
111 0 Since 1937, "there has been a virtual parade toward the greater freedom of the
Massachusetts rule." Torrance, Legal Background, Trends, and Recent Developments
in the Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAw g. CONTEMP. PROB. 128, 138 (1952). At latest
count, only five states do not adhere to some form of the "prudent man" standard.
Comment, 15 ALA. L. REv. 79, 90 (1962).
Apart from the recognition that investments in corporate stock are in fact prudent,
other reasons for the change from legal lists to the "prudent man" rule include the
realization after the Great Depression that no one type of investment can be said to
be any safer than any other and the reaction to the restrictions which the "legal list"
philosophy place on a trustee when circumstances, such as inflation, warrant a
diversification of investments. Stevenson, Why the Prudent Man?, 7 VAND. L. Rav. 74,
77-79 (1953).
""I See 3 ScoTr § 227.11, at 1690.
112 Shattuck, The Trustee's Duty to Invest, 86 TRUsrs & EsrATrs_ 119 (1948); Steven-
son, supra note 110, at 77-78.
211 It is interesting to note that the concept of a trustee's engaging in business has
been accepted by a court in a somewhat different context. In the Matter of Luckenbach,
188 Misc. 265, 42 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Surr. Ct. 1943), appeal dismissed mem., 267 App. Div.
998, 48 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 948, 58 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1945),
trustees were empowered to carry on testator's tugboat business for as long as it might
[Vol. 1967: 321
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
Thus, in Conant v. Lansden,114 the testator, owner of a majority
share in a mercantile corporation, empowered his trustees to
manage, use and conduct all of [his] . . .property, business and
affairs in such a manner as will in their judgment, yield and the best
and safest income, interest and profits .... I's
When the business encountered financial difficulties, the trustees lent
trust funds to the store on an unsecured demand note. The store
ultimately failed and full satisfaction of the loan was not realized.
The lower court found that since the store was in an uncertain
financial condition at the time of the loan, the investment was
hazardous and therefore unsuitable for trust funds."16 The trustees
were surcharged for the loss. Reversing the decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court found that though the loans were an "investment"
they were also a "means of preserving the Tamms Mercantile Com-
pany"" 7 and that the terms of the will authorized the trustees to
continue the business.
Similarly, in Holmes v. Hrobon,"18 the testator empowered his
trustee to
conduct and carry on the laundry business... and to do all things
necessary or proper in the usual course of said business ... as long
as the same may be profitable.119
Over a five-year period, the trustee acquired five competing firms at
a cost of 103,900 dollars. The beneficiary objected to these expendi-
tures and sought to hold the trustee accountable for them. The
remain profitable. In the course of operations, the trustees expanded the business until
ultimately they were engaged in intercoastal traffic with ocean-going steamers. In an
accounting, after the business had been sold, the remaindermen claimed the value of
the good will of the business as properly theirs. The trustees resisted with the allega-
tion that the testator's business had been "discontinued" since the business was being
conducted on a much grander scale than that in which the testator was engaged. In
holding for the remaindermen, the court found that the changes wrought by the trustees
were incident to the normal operation of the shipping business, that no business can
remain static, and that therefore, the trustee's administration was in compliance with
the testator's direction that .the business be continued. 188 Misc. at 275, 42 N.Y.S.2d at
798.
11, 409 111. 149, 98 N.E.2d 773 (1951), affirming in part, reversing in part 341 Ill.
App. 488, 94 N.E.2d 594 (1950).
1'r 341 IlL. App. at 497, 94 N.E.2d at 598.
'11 Id. at 498, 94 N.E.2d at 599.
117 409 Ill. at 155, 98 N.E.2d at 777.
118 158 Ohio St. 508, 110 N.E.2d 574 (1953), affirming in part, reversing in part 93
Ohio App. 1, 103 N.E.2d 845 (1951).
119 158 Ohio St. at 515-17, 110 N.E.2d at 580.
Vol. 1967: 321]
DUK, LAW JOURAAL
lower court held that the trustee could not purchase new businesses
without express authorization from the settlor; that the power
to do "all things necessary" means to do all things necessary as a
trustee and not as sole proprietor. The direction... to continue
the business "as long as the same may be profitable" does not
authorize the trustee to do everything necessary to make the busi-
ness profitable as he would do if it were operated by him as sole
proprietor.120
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decision on this point, finding
the powers of the trustee sufficiently broad to authorize all expendi-
tures necessary in the exercise of sound business judgment to operate,
maintain, and expand the business.1 21
The significance of Conant and Holmes is highlighted by the
fact that the lower court decisions exemplified traditional means of
treating trustee action. In Conant, the lower court abstracted the
trustee's loan from the realities of the transaction and viewed it as
an independent investment, applying the investment standard of the
"prudent man" rule. In Holmes, the distinction between the trustee
as prudent businessman and the trustee as prudent investor resulted
in the express denial of resort to some of the techniques of effective
business management.
The facility with which the supreme courts in Conant and Holmes
side-stepped the alternative analyses presented by the lower courts
does not indicate a revolution in the theory and application of trust
law; rather, the positions adopted demonstrate a realization that the
essential factor. is that the trustee is operating a business. Thus,
while the trustee-entrepreneur must always conduct himself as a
prudent man would, the fact that he is engaged in business opera-
tions and must of necessity take the risks incident to such activity
provides the major factor in light of which prudence is to be judged.
CONCLUSION
While courts are reluctant to allow a trustee to become involved
in a business, the central concept of trusteeship-reasonable prudence
under the circumstances-should allow a trustee, once he has under-
taken a business at the direction of a settlor, to manage it efficiently
and successfully according to common business principles. The full
120 93 Ohio App. at 32, 103 N.E.2d at 864.
'121158 Ohio St. at 527, 110 N.E.2d at 585.
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potential of this concept has been realized only to a limited extent.
Thus, with regard to the allocation of responsibility for details of
business management, the trustee may adopt a procedure consistent
with the practices dictated by prudent business principles. 22 In a
like manner, as the operation of the business progresses, the trustee
should be able to manipulate his holding as would any prudent busi-
nessman, taking the steps necessary to adjust to the forces of the
market place. Unfortunately, it is presently unclear whether the
trustee may proceed only if a cautious investor would invest funds in
the business. It is submitted that if there exists a general policy
to discourage the leaving of businesses in trust, to effectuate this
policy by restrictive rules applied to the trustee after he has under-
taken to operate a business is productive of unnecessary economic
waste in the form of unsuccessful enterprises. Such waste can
be easily prevented simply by prohibiting the business-in-trust form
or, on the other hand, by granting the trustee the leeway available
under the rule of reasonable prudence.
The present undeveloped and illiberal state of affairs in this
area of the law is probably attributable to the fact that the relative
dearth of litigation involving trustee-managed businesses has not
given the courts sufficient opportunity to view the factors involved in
depth. As the incidence of business held in trust increases, with, pre-
sumably, further judicial consideration of such holdings, it is hoped
that rules embodying modern commercial exigencies will evolve.
122 See notes 36-38, 46 supra and accompanying text.
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